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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this case of first impression, we are called upon to 
interpret and apply the United States Supreme Court's admonition 
in McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994), that 
a district court would not abuse its discretion in denying a stay 
of execution pending the presentation of a federal habeas 
petition to a "dilatory" defendant who "inexcusably ignores [the] 
opportunity [for counsel and for that counsel meaningfully to 
research and present a defendant's habeas claims] and flouts the 
available processes . . . ."  Id. at 2573.  We hold that under 
McFarland, a district court may properly refuse a stay to a 
dilatory defendant who has waived his right to counseled and 
meaningful habeas review and his state court remedies.  Since 
here, however, the defendant, even though dilatory, did not waive 
his rights or remedies, we hold that the district court's 
decision to deny him a stay of execution was not consistent with 
a sound exercise of discretion. 
 
I. 
 In the afternoon of February 19, 1984, Kathy Kurmchack, 
then 19 years of age, was found stabbed to death in a restroom in 
the restaurant where she worked.  Steven Duffey was charged with 
the killing. 
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 On February 6, 1985, a jury found Duffey guilty of 
first degree murder.  Following the denial of post-verdict 
motions, Duffey was formally sentenced, on August 4, 1986, to 
death.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Duffey's 
conviction and sentence on October 14, 1988.  Commonwealth v. 
Duffey, 519 Pa. 353, 548 A.2d 1178 (1988). 
 On September 22, 1994, Governor Robert P. Casey signed 
a death warrant scheduling Duffey's execution for the week of 
December 4, 1994.  On October 12, 1994, Duffey met with attorneys 
from the Pennsylvania Capital Case Resource Center (the "Resource 
Center") and signed an unsworn declaration of indigency and a 
request that the Resource Center seek a stay of execution and the 
recruitment of competent counsel to commence state post-
conviction proceedings on his behalf. 
 Unable to recruit counsel, on November 16, 1994, the 
Resource Center filed in the trial court a pro se motion for a 
stay of execution to identify and appoint counsel for Duffey. The 
motion was denied on November 18, 1994; a motion for 
reconsideration was denied on November 22, 1994.   
 Believing that the trial court's denials were 
predicated on its view that it lacked jurisdiction to stay 
Duffey's execution in the absence of a petition filed under 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq., the Resource Center then filed a 
"Renewed Pro Se Motion for Stay of Execution to Permit Counsel 
Time to Prepare PCRA Petition", to which a "form" PCRA petition 
raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
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attached.  On or about November 22, 1994, the trial court denied 
the motion for stay based on the "frivolous" nature of the PCRA 
petition and Duffey's delay in asserting the ineffectiveness of 
counsel claim.  An appeal of the trial court's order was taken to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on November 28, 1994. 
 That same day, Duffey filed a "Motion to Proceed In 
Forma Pauperis, for a Stay of Execution, and for Appointment of 
Federal Habeas Corpus Counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 2251 and 21 
U.S.C. § 848(q) -- and -- Complaint for Injunctive Relief under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983"0 in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, naming as respondents several 
officials with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.0 
Expressing its strong hesitation to take any action while 
Duffey's request for a stay to pursue his state remedies was 
pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the district court 
reserved ruling on the motion.   
 After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Duffey's 
request for a stay on December 5, 1994, the district court issued 
a memorandum opinion and order, permitting Duffey to proceed in 
forma pauperis and granting Duffey's request for the appointment 
of federal habeas corpus counsel.0  With regard to Duffey's 
                     
0
 Duffy's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed 
without prejudice on December 22, 1994. 
0
 The respondents, the appellees here, refer to 
themselves in their brief as the "Commonwealth [of 
Pennsylvania]."  We will adopt that designation. 
0
 We understand that Duffey is presently represented by 
legal counsel.  We also understand that on or about April 27, 
1995, counsel filed an "Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Collateral Relief" in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawana 
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request for a stay of execution, the court interpreted the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. 
___, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994), as holding that a stay was required 
unless Duffey "inexcusably ignored post-conviction remedies for 
the purpose of delaying his execution."  Finding the record 
undeveloped in this regard, the court issued a temporary stay 
until December 23, 1994, to allow the parties the opportunity to 
submit evidence as to whether Duffey's six-year "delay" in 
invoking post-conviction review was justifiable.  
 After a hearing, the court held that Duffey was not 
entitled to a stay of execution pending habeas review.  The court 
found that Duffey was aware that state and federal collateral 
review procedures are available to capital defendants; that 
Duffey knew that he no longer had legal representation and that a 
collateral challenge to his conviction and sentence was not being 
mounted on his behalf following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
affirmance of his conviction and sentence; that Duffey was 
capable of deciding and had decided to delay the invocation of 
the post-conviction process in order to forestall the imposition 
of his sentence; and that the Resource Center had proceeded in 
this matter in good faith.  Seeing no evidence in the record to 
support a finding that the Commonwealth had interfered with 
Duffey's rights or that Duffey was incompetent, the court further 
found that Duffey had not shown "cause" either for his 
"deliberate decision" not to challenge his conviction and 
                                                                  
County, Pennsylvania.  The status of this petition is not before 
us, nor is it relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. 
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sentence until a death warrant had issued or for "ignoring" post-
conviction remedies.  The court, therefore, concluded that under 
McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2573, Duffey's 
inaction was "inexcusable" and constituted a "flouting of the 
available processes".  Accordingly, the court denied Duffey's 
request for a stay pending preparation of a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus and vacated the temporary stay it had granted on 
December 5, 1994.  Duffey's appeal followed.0 
 
II. 
 In McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2568 
(1994),0 the Supreme Court was presented with a two-pronged 
                     
0
 We granted a temporary stay of execution pending this 
appeal. 
0
 Frank Basil McFarland was convicted of murder in the 
State of Texas and sentenced to death.  Two months after the 
final resolution of McFarland's direct appeal, the Texas trial 
court scheduled his execution.  Unable to secure either the 
appointment of counsel or a modification of his execution date in 
the trial court for state habeas corpus proceedings, McFarland 
filed a pro se motion in a federal district court, alleging that 
he "wish[ed]" to challenge his conviction and sentence under the 
federal habeas corpus statute.  McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 
114 S. Ct. 2568, 2570 (1995).  McFarland also asked for the 
appointment of counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and a stay 
of execution to enable counsel to prepare and file a habeas 
corpus petition.  Id.  Of the view that a "post conviction 
proceeding" had not been initiated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or 
§2255, the district court denied McFarland's motion on the 
grounds that McFarland was not entitled to the appointment of 
counsel and that it lacked jurisdiction to enter a stay of 
execution.  Id. at 2571.  Affirming, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 2251, 
a federal court may stay state proceedings while a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding is pending, but held that no such proceeding 
was pending because a "`motion for a stay and for appointment of 
counsel [is not] the equivalent of an application for habeas 
relief.'"  Id. (citation omitted). 
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inquiry of statutory construction:  whether a capital defendant's 
right under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) to qualified counsel in "any 
post-conviction proceeding under sections 2254 or 2255 of Title 
28" and a district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2251 to 
enter a stay of execution "in a habeas corpus proceeding" adhere 
prior to the filing of a legally sufficient habeas corpus 
petition.0  The Court determined that they did.   
                                                                  
 The Supreme Court reversed.   
0
 The Supreme Court was required to construe the meaning 
of and interplay among 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. 
§§2251, 2254, 2255.   
 Section 848(q)(4)(B) states: 
 
§ 848.  Continuing criminal enterprise 
 
Appeal in capital cases; counsel for 
financially unable defendants 
 
 (B) In any post conviction proceeding 
under section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28, 
seeking to vacate or set aside a death 
sentence, any defendant who is or becomes 
financially unable to obtain adequate 
representation or investigative, expert, or 
other reasonably necessary services shall be 
entitled to appointment of one or more 
attorneys and the furnishing of such other 
services in accordance with paragraphs (5), 
(6), (7), (8), and (9). 
 
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). 
 
 Sections 2254 and 2255 provide in pertinent part: 
 
§ 2254.  State custody; remedies in Federal 
        courts. 
 
  (a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a 
circuit judge, or a district court shall 
entertain an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus in behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
only on the ground that he is in custody in 
8 
 The Court held first that "[t]he language and purposes 
of § 848(q)(4)(B) and its related provisions establish that a 
right to appointed counsel includes a right to legal assistance 
in the preparation of a habeas corpus application[,] . . . [such] 
that a `post conviction proceeding' within the meaning of 
§848(q)(4)(B) is commenced by the filing of a death row 
                                                                  
violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
 
§ 2255.  Federal Custody; remedies on motion 
        attacking sentence 
 
  A prisoner in custody under sentence of a 
court established by Act of Congress claiming 
the right to be released upon the ground that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or 
that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence 
was in excess of the maximum authorized by 
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack, may move the court which imposed the 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence. 
 
Id. § 2255. 
 
 Section 2251 states: 
 
§ 2251.  Stay of State court proceedings 
 
  A justice or judge of the United States 
before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is 
pending, may, before final judgment or after 
final judgment of discharge, or pending 
appeal, stay any proceeding against the 
person detained in any State court or by or 
under the authority of any State for any 
matter involved in the habeas corpus 
proceeding. 
 
Id. § 2251. 
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defendant's motion requesting the appointment of counsel for his 
federal habeas corpus proceeding."  Id. at 2572-73 (footnote 
omitted).  The Court further held that once a capital defendant 
invokes his right to appointed counsel, a federal court also has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2251 to enter a stay of execution 
because the language in 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), i.e., "any post 
conviction proceeding under sections 2254 or 2255 of Title 28", 
and the language in 28 U.S.C. § 2251, i.e., "habeas corpus 
proceeding", refer to the same process.  Id. at 2573. 
 The Court made clear, however, that its holding did not 
grant defendants a right to an automatic stay of execution; that 
the decision to grant or deny a motion for stay is committed to 
the district court's sound discretion; and that a "dilatory" 
defendant's request for a stay may be denied under the 
appropriate circumstances: 
 This conclusion by no means grants 
capital defendants a right to an automatic 
stay of execution.  Section 2251 does not 
mandate the entry of a stay, but dedicates 
the exercise of stay jurisdiction to the 
sound discretion of a federal court.  Under 
ordinary circumstances, a capital defendant 
presumably will have sufficient time to 
request the appointment of counsel and file a 
formal habeas petition prior to his scheduled 
execution.  But the right to counsel 
necessarily includes a right for that counsel 
meaningfully to research and present a 
defendant's habeas claims.  Where this 
opportunity is not afforded, "[a]pproving the 
execution of a defendant before his 
[petition] is decided on the merits would 
clearly be improper."  On the other hand, if 
a dilatory capital defendant inexcusably 
ignores this opportunity and flouts the 
available processes, a federal court 
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presumably would not abuse its discretion in 
denying a stay of execution. 
 
Id. at 2573 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
III. 
 Before we consider the merits of the district court's 
decision to deny Duffey a stay of execution, we must confirm that 
the court's jurisdiction was properly invoked, for we agree with 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that "[w]hat can best 
be called a `McFarland stay' is not available for every death row 
prisoner, but only for those in McFarland's circumstances".  In 
Re Parker, 49 F.3d 204, 213 (6th Cir. 1995).0  Like the defendant 
in McFarland, however, Duffey was an uncounseled, pro se prisoner 
who commenced an action in federal court seeking an attorney and 
a stay of execution in order to file a legally competent petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  Because Duffey was unrepresented, 
he properly exercised his statutory right to appointed counsel 
under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) which, in turn, invoked the stay 
jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2251.   
                     
0
 There the court of appeals held that the district court 
was without jurisdiction to issue a "McFarland" stay where the 
defendant asked the district court to appoint the attorney who 
already represented him and to issue an indefinite stay of 
execution to give counsel more time to file a habeas corpus 
petition.  In Re Parker, 49 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 1995).  In Steffen 
v. Tate, 39 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 1994), the defendant sought a 
federal court stay of execution to enable his counsel to pursue 
additional state remedies on his behalf.   
 
 In both of these cases, the court of appeals reasoned 
that the district court's jurisdiction was not necessary to give 
effect to the statutory right to counseled federal habeas review. 
In Re Parker, 49 F.3d at 210-11; Steffen v. Tate, 39 F.3d at 624-
25. 
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          We thus conclude that the court had jurisdiction in 
this case.  We turn now to the district court's decision that 
Duffey was not entitled to a stay of execution.     
 
IV. 
 We first consider the district court's findings of 
fact.  Our standard of review is quite high; we may set aside the 
court's findings only for clear error.0  Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 
F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1983).   
 Duffy argues that the evidence conclusively establishes 
that he was ignorant of post-conviction processes; that during 
the entire period between the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
affirmance of his conviction and sentence in 1988 and until just 
before the warrant was signed in 1994, he mistakenly believed 
that he was represented by counsel who was handling his 
"appeals"; and that he was intellectually incapable of the 
thought and planning that necessarily underlie a deliberate 
decision to delay the pursuit of one's rights.   
          Based on our careful review of the record, however, we 
conclude that the district court's factual determinations to the 
contrary are amply supported by the record.  Several items of 
proof sustain the court's finding that Duffey was aware of the 
                     
0
 A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed". United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 394-95 (1948).  Further, we will not disturb the district 
court's findings simply because we are convinced that we would 
have decided the case differently.  Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). 
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existence of federal and state procedures for post-conviction 
review.  In correspondence to his mother, Duffey repeatedly 
requested that she send him a copy of another prisoner's habeas 
corpus petition; a fellow death row prisoner whom Duffey 
described as a "big brother" was well-versed in post-conviction 
process; information about collateral challenges to convictions 
and sentences was ever-present in the environment in which Duffey 
had resided for almost ten years.  In addition, Duffey referred 
to the case of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),0 in a 
knowledgeable way in a letter he wrote to his mother and in a 
motion he filed in the state court requesting a copy of his trial 
transcript; and during his years on death row, Duffey was in 
contact with Pamela Tucker, a one-time member of the Western 
Pennsylvania Coalition against the Death Penalty and the Project 
Director of the Pennsylvania Capital Case Monitoring Project who 
sent prisoners, including Duffey, at least one update regarding 
developments in Pennsylvania death penalty cases which mentioned 
the "[Post Conviction Relief Act]". 
                     
0
 In Griffin, the defendants filed a petition under the 
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, alleging, inter alia, that 
the only impediment to full appellate review of their respective 
convictions was a lack of funds to buy a trial transcript and 
that the State's refusal to afford full appellate review solely 
because of their poverty was a denial of due process and equal 
protection.  The defendants' petition was dismissed and the 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, solely on the ground that the 
petition did not raise a substantial state or federal 
constitutional question.  Holding that the defendants' 
constitutional rights had been violated, the Court remanded and 
instructed the Illinois Supreme Court to provide the defendants 
with adequate and effective appellate review.  Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-26 (1956). 
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 We also find that the evidence relating to Duffey's and 
his mother's conduct both before and after the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's October, 1988 affirmance of Duffey's conviction 
and sentence supports the court's finding that Duffey knew that 
he did not have legal counsel and that post-conviction remedies 
were not being pursued following the affirmance.  The record 
reveals that during the time that Duffey's case was in trial and 
on direct appeal, he and his mother communicated by letter or 
telephone with his attorneys on a variety of matters; once Duffey 
received word of the affirmance, however, neither he nor his 
mother had contact with any lawyer about the status of his case. 
Moreover, a statement by Duffey in a 1991 letter to Pamela Tucker 
that he would know "something" about his case "once [he] [got] a 
[w]arrant signed" also supports the district court's factual 
finding that Duffey was aware that post-conviction challenges 
were not pending from October of 1988 to September of 1994. 
 With regard to Duffey's deliberative capacities, the 
Resource Center introduced expert testimony to establish that 
Duffey could not reason abstractly due to his intellectual and 
emotional deficiencies and the medication he was taking.  The 
Commonwealth countered with expert testimony to show that Duffey 
was capable of assimilating information, implementing plans and 
appreciating the consequences of his actions.  Thus the hearing 
on this issue was a dispute among experts, offering the district 
court two conflicting perspectives of Duffey's abilities. 
Crediting the Commonwealth's view, the court found that Duffey 
was competent and capable of deliberately deciding not to 
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challenge his conviction and sentence until a warrant was signed. 
We will not disturb this finding because it is "well-established 
that `[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, 
the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous'", and in a battle of experts, the factfinder 
"'decide[s] the victor'".  Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. 
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson 
v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) and citing 
Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 
1993)).   
          As to Duffy's decision to delay, the comments Duffey 
and his mother made in correspondence to the effect that "no news 
was good news" and that it would be unwise to call attention to 
his circumstances support the court's finding that Duffey did 
indeed decide to wait for a death warrant to issue before 
pursuing post-conviction process and that he understood that, by 
putting off the invocation of post-conviction processes until 
then, he could postpone his sentence.  Moreover, the court 
correctly found that the record did not contain any proof that 
the Commonwealth prevented Duffey from pursuing his rights. 
 Finally, given the undisputed evidence the Resource 
Center submitted showing how severely limited its means are, the 
court's finding that the Center pursued this matter in good faith 
will not be set aside.   
          Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's 
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. 
 
15 
V. 
 We next address the district court's interpretation of 
the instruction in McFarland concerning the denial of a stay to a 
dilatory defendant who "inexcusably ignores" certain rights 
relating to habeas review and "flouts the available processes". 
Since we view the Court's instruction as a legal standard to be 
applied to the facts, our review is plenary.  Sullivan v. Cuyler, 
723 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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A.  
 We begin by stating explicitly what was implicit in the 
district court's decision:  that the opportunity and processes of 
which the Supreme Court spoke in the passage at issue, supra pp. 
9-10, include the right to federal habeas counsel, time for that 
counsel to prepare a habeas petition, and available state 
remedies.  We believe that the Court's antecedent reference in 
that passage to a capital defendant's "right to counsel" and 
counsel's right "meaningfully to research and present a 
defendant's habeas claims", McFarland v. Scott, ___U.S.___, 114 
S. Ct. at 2573, as well as the long-held principle, now codified 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),0 that a state defendant must exhaust 
state remedies in order to receive federal habeas review, compel 
this result.  See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (holding 
that as a matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a 
claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts 
have had an opportunity to act).  Moreover, the exhaustion of 
                     
0
 Section 2254(b) provides: 
 
 § 2254.  State custody; remedies in Federal 
          courts. 
 
 (b) An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus in behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State curt 
shall not be granted unless it appears that 
the applicant has exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State, or that 
there is either an absence of available State 
corrective process or the existence of 
circumstances rendering such process 
ineffective to protect the rights of the 
prisoner. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 
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state remedies doctrine leads us to conclude that the district 
court was correct to consider the question of Duffey's delay in 
asking for federal habeas relief, not from the date that the 
death warrant issued on September 22, 1994, as Duffey urges, but 
from the date that Duffey could have initiated state post-
conviction process, which was some six years earlier upon 
resolution of his direct appeal on October 14, 1988.  In this 
regard, we also point out that delay in this context does not 
refer to the mere passage of time, but to a defendant's 
postponing the initiation of any of the steps that lead to habeas 
review. 
B. 
 Turning to the standard the district court used to 
determine whether, under McFarland, Duffey should be granted a 
stay of execution despite his delay, we note that the court 
required Duffey to establish "cause" to excuse his failure to 
pursue available post-conviction processes in an expeditious 
fashion.  By doing so, the court borrowed directly from the 
"cause and prejudice" or "independent state ground" test of 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which bars federal 
habeas review where a defendant has failed to comply with a state 
procedural rule unless the defendant shows "cause" for his 
failure to comply with a state procedural requirement and actual 
"prejudice" as a result of the constitutional violations he 
presents in federal court.    
 We disagree with the district court's analogy to Sykes 
for two reasons.  First, we do not see, nor has the Commonwealth 
18 
of Pennsylvania shown us, that the basis for the standard -- a 
state procedural requirement -- is present here.  The 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq., does not impose a time period within 
which a defendant must file a petition for collateral review. 
Moreover, it is standard practice in Pennsylvania for defendants 
to pursue an initial, counseled PCRA petition only after a death 
warrant has issued and for the Pennsylvania courts to grant stays 
of execution to defendants in these circumstances.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Henry, No. 849-1986 (C.P. Northampton Cty. March, 
1995, and cases cited therein).  Second and more importantly, we 
cannot discern any basis in McFarland for the district court's 
approach.  Had the Supreme Court intended the courts to apply the 
standard enunciated in Sykes when deciding whether a dilatory 
defendant may receive a stay, we believe the Court would have 
said so.  Thus, even assuming the presence of a state procedural 
default, we conclude that Sykes does not control. 
 It remains for us, therefore, to determine what 
standard regarding the denial of a stay was announced by the 
Court in McFarland.  We think the best source for the standard 
lies in the language the Court used to render its decision. 
Accordingly, we turn directly to McFarland's critical passage, 
supra pp. 9-10, and we first observe that delay alone is not 
dispositive; the Court referred to denying a stay not just to a 
"dilatory" defendant, but to a defendant who has also behaved in 
a particular manner and displayed a certain attitude with regard 
to the opportunity for counseled habeas review and available 
19 
processes.  The words the Court chose to describe the conduct it 
denounced -- "inexcusably ignore" and "flout" -- connote a 
knowing disregard, which borders on contempt for and a turning 
away from, one's federal and state rights.  In our view, these 
words are tantamount to the definition of waiver enunciated in 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938): "an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege". We, 
therefore, believe that the Court instructed in McFarland that a 
district court would not abuse its discretion in denying a stay 
to a defendant who delayed pursuit of habeas relief and whose 
actions constitute a waiver of the right to counseled and 
meaningful habeas review and available state processes.  In this 
regard, we adopt the definition of waiver from Johnson v. Zerbst 
as the guiding standard.0   
                     
0
 In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court 
addressed a defendant's waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to 
the assistance of counsel.  
 
 The dissent's characterization of our analysis 
notwithstanding, we do not "import Johnson v. Zerbst's `waiver' 
requirement into McFarland" because we believe that the "right to 
appointed counsel in § 848(q)(4)(B) occupies the same venerated 
status as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."  (Dissent 
Typescript at 11-12). Our holding is premised, as we stated, on 
our interpretation of the language the Supreme Court used in the 
McFarland opinion. 
 
 In our view, the disagreement between the majority and 
the dissent in this case is straightforward; it is a disagreement 
over what the Supreme Court meant in McFarland when it stated 
that a "dilatory capital defendant" who "inexcusably ignores this 
opportunity and flouts the available processes" may be denied a 
stay of execution.  McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 
at 2573.  As we understand it, the dissent's position is that 
with these words the Supreme Court invoked the equitable doctrine 
of unclean hands, inviting a district court to deny a McFarland 
stay to a defendant who engaged in inequitable conduct.  Applying 
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          We further hold that a defendant's delay and waiver, 
which are in the nature of a defense to the stay to which a 
defendant would otherwise be entitled, is for the State to prove. 
This allocation of the burden of proof is consistent with the 
manner by which defenses are typically proven, Metzel v. 
                                                                  
this general principle to the facts at hand, the dissent would 
hold that an uncounseled defendant who created exigent 
circumstances by purposefully delaying the pursuit of post-
conviction processes until a death warrant issued, is guilty of 
unclean hands, and, thus, may be denied a stay of execution 
pending the preparation and disposition of a first habeas corpus 
petition.  Again, focusing on the Supreme Court's words in 
McFarland, our difficulty with the dissent's position is two-
fold.  First, we believe that they demand a more exacting 
standard than the dissent's unclean hands principle.  Second, we 
believe that they require something more than mere delay, even if 
deliberate, on a defendant's part to disentitle him to a stay. 
 
 To be sure, "`habeas corpus has traditionally been 
regarded as governed by equitable principles'".  Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391, 438 (1963)).  We do not, however, agree with the 
dissent's view that "abuse-of-the writ" or "misuse-of-the-writ" 
jurisprudence supports the application in a McFarland situation 
of an unclean hands doctrine under which delay alone is 
sufficient to deny a stay of execution.  (Dissent Typescript at 
6-7).  See, e.g., Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 
653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (vacating a stay of execution where 
petitioner failed to show cause for not raising the claim that 
his execution by lethal injection would violate the Eighth 
Amendment in four prior federal habeas petitions and where 
"[t]here [was] no good reason for this abusive delay, which [was] 
compounded by last-minute attempts to manipulate the judicial 
process."); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that 
the cause and prejudice standard enunciated in Wainwright v. 
Sykes applies to determine whether the failure to raise a claim 
in the first round of habeas review should be excused in a 
subsequent petition); Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590 (11th Cir.) 
(vacating a stay of execution where petitioner expressly refused 
to pursue state collateral remedies, consistently waited until 
the day of execution to seek relief, and openly sought federal 
habeas relief, not to vindicate his constitutional rights, but to 
delay his execution so that the method of execution may be 
changed to allow him to donate his organs), cert.granted, ___ 
U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995). 
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Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 1995), and is, moreover, in 
keeping with the traditional application of the Johnson v. Zerbst 
waiver standard.  See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 
(1977) ("[A]s a matter of federal constitutional law . . . it was 
incumbent upon the State to prove `an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'")(quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464).0       
 
VI. 
 The application of the standard we have enunciated to 
the evidence in this case is not difficult.  Although we do not 
quarrel with the district court's ultimate finding that Duffey 
deliberately decided to postpone the pursuit of collateral 
challenges to his conviction and sentence until after a death 
warrant issued, it alone cannot sustain the court's conclusion 
that Duffey inexcusably ignored and flouted relevant rights and 
processes under our waiver standard.  Indeed, we find the record 
devoid of any proof whatsoever that Duffey intentionally 
relinquished or abandoned his rights to counseled and meaningful 
habeas review or to available state remedies.0  Thus, we conclude 
                     
0
 Although that traditional application of the Johnson v. 
Zerbst standard of which the Court spoke in Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977), involved the waiver of the 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, we do not see 
any reason for not requiring the State to bear the same burden of 
proof when the waiver involves the statutory right to counseled 
federal habeas review under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) and the 
right to state post-conviction remedies. 
0
 We contemplate that proof of a defendant's waiver will 
frequently be "verbal"; that is, comprised of the words that a 
defendant has spoken or written which show that he or she has 
intentionally relinquished or abandoned his or her federal right 
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that under McFarland the district court's decision to deny Duffey 
a stay was not consistent with a sound exercise of discretion.   
 We do not reach this decision lightly and we are, of 
course, mindful of the Commonwealth's interest in seeing that 
criminal judgments and sentences are carried out in a orderly 
fashion.  We are also, however, aware of the Commonwealth's 
desire to ensure that capital punishment comports with the 
Constitution.  Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 
(1978).  We believe that the entry of a stay in this particular 
case does not upset the Commonwealth's capital punishment process 
but, rather, guarantees that the death penalty will not be 
carried out unless the habeas review to which this defendant 
remains entitled demonstrates that his execution would be lawful. 
 
VII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order denying Duffy a stay and remand to the court for 
entry of an order granting Duffey a stay of execution pending the 
presentation of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus0 once the 
state courts have ruled on his post-conviction petition. 
                                                                  
to counseled habeas review and applicable state remedies.  We 
further contemplate that evidence of waiver will also involve a 
defendant's actions.  We do not, as the dissent suggests, require 
that the Commonwealth prove waiver by showing that a defendant 
knew specifically of the existence of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) 
and engaged in what amounts to a colloquy forgoing his or her 
right to a government-supplied attorney under the statute. 
(Dissent Typescript at 10, 15-16).   
0
 During the December, 1994 hearing, the Resource Center 
clarified that Duffey was asking for a stay pending the 
presentation of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and would 
23 
Duffey v. Lehman, No. 94-9003 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 The district court found as a matter of fact that 
Steven Duffey sat on death row for six and one-half years after 
his conviction had been affirmed and, despite being aware of the 
existence of both state and federal post-conviction remedies, 
intentionally declined to invoke them for the specific purpose of 
delay.  Based on these findings the district court concluded that 
Duffey had "inexcusably ignore[d] [post-conviction remedies] and 
flout[ed] the available processes."  McFarland v. Scott, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2573 (1994). The court, therefore, 
denied Duffey's request for a stay of execution under 28 U.S.C. 
§2251 while counsel appointed under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) 
prepared and filed a first petition for habeas corpus. 
 The Majority concludes, as do I, that the district 
court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous.  Indeed, they 
are amply supported by record evidence.  The Majority, however, 
has discovered a "waiver" requirement in McFarland's "inexcusably 
ignores" language.  Applying it to the district court's factual 
findings, the Majority holds that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying a stay under McFarland because the record 
                                                                  
leave it to appointed counsel to ask for a stay beyond that point 
for the duration of habeas review. 
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contains no evidence that Duffey affirmatively "waived" his right 
to appointed habeas counsel. 
 I find no such waiver requirement in McFarland.  In my 
view, an inmate who purposely declines to pursue known post-
conviction remedies for the specific purpose of delaying 
execution presents the quintessential case of "inexcusably 
ignor[ing] . . . and 
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flout[ing]."  Such an inmate comes into court with "unclean hands" and, thus, forfeits his 
right to have a federal court invoke its equity jurisdiction under § 2251 to intervene in 
state proceedings.  Because that is just what Duffey did, the district court's decision to 
deny a stay of execution was consistent with a sound exercise of discretion.  I therefore 
must respectfully dissent.  I am, however, in substantial agreement with Parts I-IV of the 
Majority Opinion. 
I. 
A. 
 In 1988 Congress amended federal law to provide indigent death-row inmates 
wishing to pursue federal habeas relief with a government-supplied lawyer to prepare and 
file the petition. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B).  This amendment created an inevitable 
tension with 28 U.S.C. § 2251, which permits a federal judge to stay state proceedings 
only when a habeas corpus proceeding is "pending" in federal court.  Typically, a 
proceeding was considered pending for purposes of § 2251 only when a formal petition had 
been filed.  Thus, prior to McFarland, death-row inmates conceivably could have been 
executed before their appointed attorneys had an adequate opportunity to prepare and file 
their petitions, since in those circumstances a federal court would lack subject
jurisdiction to stay an execution. 
 In 1994 the Supreme Court alleviated this apparent unfairness by essentially 
deeming an unrepresented death-row inmate's request for counsel under § 848(q)(4)(B) to 
a pending habeas proceeding for purposes of § 2251.  McFarland, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. 
Ct. at 2568.  Accordingly, as long as there has been a motion for the appointment of 
counsel under § 848(q)(4)(B), a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction under § 2251 
to stay state proceedings without running afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 
2283. 
B. 
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 Two separate and distinct concepts underlie the McFarland Court's reasoning and 
analysis.  I refer to them as "stay jurisdiction" and "stay discretion."  The rationale 
for McFarland's "stay jurisdiction" holding--that a request for counsel constitutes a 
"pending" proceeding under § 2251--is understandable.  The Court believed that where an 
unrepresented death-row inmate wishes to invoke his statutory right to have an attorney 
file a petition for habeas corpus, federal courts should have the power to ensure that the 
state will not execute the inmate before the petition has been filed.  Otherwise, the 
right to an attorney free of charge would be meaningless.  McFarland, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 
S. Ct. at 2573 ("[T]he right to counsel necessarily includes a right for that counsel 
meaningfully to research and present a defendant's habeas claims.  Where this opportunity 
is not afforded, approving the execution of a defendant before his petition is decided on 
the merits would clearly be improper.") (internal quotation marks, alteration and citation 
omitted). 
 The Court warned, however, that its "conclusion by no means grants capital 
defendants a right to an automatic stay of execution."  Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2573.  
On the contrary, in the "stay discretion" portion of its discussion, the Court observed 
that 
[s]ection 2251 does not mandate the entry of a stay, but 
dedicates the exercise of stay jurisdiction to the sound 
discretion of a federal court. Under ordinary circumstances, 
a capital inmate presumably will have sufficient time to 
request the appointment of counsel and file a formal habeas 
petition prior to his scheduled execution.  But the right to 
counsel necessarily includes a right for that counsel 
meaningfully to research and present a defendant's habeas 
claims.  Where this opportunity is not afforded, approving 
the execution of a defendant before his petition is decided 
on the merits would clearly be improper.  On the other hand, 
if a dilatory capital defendant inexcusably ignores this 
opportunity and flouts the available processes, a federal 
court presumably would not abuse its discretion in denying a 
stay of execution. 
 
27 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, alteration and citation omitted).  It is 
the proper interpretation of the second highlighted portion in the above-quoted language 
that divides us today. 
 The "stay discretion" aspect of the McFarland Court's analysis actually 
describes three separate and distinct situations. In the first situation--i.e., "[u]nder 
ordinary circumstances"--no stay should issue because the inmate is represented and has 
ample time in which to file the petition.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit has gone so far as to hold that a district court lacks even the subject
jurisdiction to grant a stay in those circumstances.  In re Parker, 49 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 
1995). The Parker court reasoned that an already-represented inmate who nevertheless 
a formal request for counsel under §848(q)(4)(B) cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction 
on a federal court to issue a stay of execution under McFarland.  Accord Steffen v. Tate
39 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 The second situation was the one presented in McFarland itself: where, on the 
eve of execution, an unrepresented, nondilatory inmate who wishes to file a first petition 
for habeas corpus seeks counsel under § 848(q)(4)(B) and moves for a stay of execution 
under § 2251.  In such a situation, a federal court would abuse its discretion as a matter 
of law in not granting the stay. This is only logical.  It is both unfair and "improper" 
to permit an inmate who, like McFarland, has been frantically attempting to pursue post
conviction remedies to be executed simply because the state's execution machinery 
functions more efficiently than the pro se litigant.  In that situation it is the state, 
not the inmate, that has created the exigency necessitating federal court equity relief in 
the nature of a stay of execution. 
 The third situation is the one we confront in this case: where, on the eve of 
execution, an unrepresented, dilatory inmate invokes his right to counsel under § 
848(q)(4)(B) and moves for a stay under § 2251 so that appointed counsel can prep
file a habeas petition.  McFarland makes very clear that such inmates have no 
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entitlement to a stay of execution.  Since the Court referred to "inexcusably ignoring
and given the context of that statement, the Court was referring to inmates who, by their 
own calculated inaction, have created the exigency necessitating a stay of execution.  In 
the Court's view, because § 2251 "dedicates the exercise of stay jurisdiction to the sound 
discretion of a federal court," ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2573, a capital inmate's 
dilatory conduct in creating the necessity of federal court intervention into state 
proceedings is a relevant (and in some cases a dispositive) factor in deciding whether to 
grant a stay of execution, even where it is the inmate's first petition. 
 To be sure, the McFarland Court's "inexcusably ignores" language might be 
considered a change in direction to the extent that it contemplates allowing an inmate to 
be executed before a first habeas petition can be considered on the merits.  Cf. 
v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590 (11th Cir.) (vacating stay and dismissing capital inmate's first 
habeas petition filed on the eve of execution solely for the purpose of delay), 
granted, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995).  But McFarland is not to that extent inconsistent with 
prior Supreme Court cases dealing with dilatory habeas petitioners.  On the contrary, the 
Court has recognized that the remedy of federal habeas is an equitable one that, along 
with its attendant stay provision, implicates sensitive federalism concerns. McClesky v. 
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 
887, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3392 (1983). 
 Because it is an equitable remedy, moreover, Justice Brennan wrote in Sanders v. 
United States that a petitioner's dilatoriness (i.e., "unclean hands") can bar federal 
habeas relief: 
[A habeas petitioner's] conduct . . . may disentitle him to 
the relief he seeks. . . . Nothing in the traditions of 
habeas corpus requires the federal courts to . . . entertain 
collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, 
or delay. 
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373 U.S. 1, 17-18, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 1078 (1963), overruled in part on other grounds
McClesky, 499 U.S. at 467, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. More recently, the High Court granted a 
State's motion to vacate a stay of execution, noting that even apart from the abuse
the-writ doctrine applicable to successive petitions, 
[e]quity must take into consideration the State's strong 
interest in proceeding with its judgment and [the inmate's] 
obvious attempt at manipulation. . . . There is no good 
reason for . . . abusive delay, which has been compounded by 
last-minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process.  A 
court may consider the last-minute nature of an application 
to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable 
relief. 
 
Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653, 654, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (
curiam) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, this court has long recognized 
that inequitable conduct can preclude a party from obtaining equitable relief: 
 The guiding doctrine in this case is the equitable 
maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands."  This maxim is far more than a mere banality. It is 
a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of 
equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith 
relative to the matter in which he seeks relief . . . . 
 
Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir.) (quoting Precision Instrument 
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S. Ct. 993, 997 (1945)), cert. denied
407 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2463 (1972).  Accord Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle
F.2d 1342, 1354 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989). 
 McFarland's "inexcusably ignores" language is simply a logical extension of the 
equitable principles set forth in Gomez and Sanders.  Deliberately declining to invoke 
postconviction processes to delay execution constitutes inequitable conduct.  When such 
conduct results in a last-minute application for equitable relief in federal court, it can 
preclude an inmate from having a federal court invoke its equity jurisdiction to intervene 
into state proceedings.  Far from relying on "mere delay" or "delay alone," Majority 
Typescript at 20 n.11, my interpretation of McFarland would permit denial of a stay only 
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where there has been abusive delay--that is, where the failure to invoke known collateral 
processes is not the result of some force external to the inmate, but rather is the 
product of a deliberate attempt to manipulate the remedy of federal habeas corpus, which 
the Majority acknowledges is governed by equitable principles.  Id.  "Federal habeas [is 
not] a means by which a defendant is entitled to delay an execution indefinitely."  
Barefoot,  463 U.S. at 887, 103 S. Ct at 3392. 
C. 
 Although I agree with the Majority that "[t]he application of the [McFarland
standard . . . to the evidence in this case is not difficult,"  Majority Typescript at 21, 
I reach a contrary result.  As Part IV of the Majority Opinion illustrates, the record 
developed below amply supports the district court's factual findings.  The district court 
found: (1) "that [Duffey] was indeed aware that there were available post-conviction 
review processes for him,"  App. at 32; (2) that "[t]he evidence concerning his mental 
disorder, the prescription of a low dosage of Mellaril, is not the type of evidence that 
would cause a court to determine that failure to take action should be excused," 
37-38; and (3) that "it was a deliberate decision on the part of Mr. Duffey not to take 
any action to challenge his convictions until a warrant had been signed."  Id. at 34.
 Based on these findings, the district court announced its legal conclusion: 
"[Duffey] certainly had the ability to understand that by delaying invoking post
conviction processes, he could obtain additional time, [an] additional stay, and forestall 
the execution of a death warrant."  Id. at 34-35.  Since the district court's factual 
findings demonstrate conclusively that Duffey had "unclean hands," the court acted well 
within its discretion in denying Duffey's last-minute request to stay his execution.
II. 
 Notwithstanding factual findings that track McFarland's language nearly to the 
word, the Majority concludes that those findings are insufficient to justify the denial of 
a stay. Instead, the Majority reverses and directs entry of a stay under McFarland
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matter of law.  Two distinct reasons appear to support the Majority's decision; I will 
discuss them in turn. 
A. 
 According to the Majority, the primary reason that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the requested stay is because the State failed to prove that Duffey, 
"even though dilatory, . . . waive[d] his rights and remedies" under the waiver standard 
the Supreme Court enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).  
Majority Typescript at 2, 19 
(emphasis added).  This new-found "waiver" requirement, according to the Majority, is 
implicit in and consistent with the McFarland Court's "inexcusably ignores . . . and 
flouts" language.  But strict adherence to the Majority's caveat that "the best source for 
the standard lies in the language the [McFarland] Court used," id. at 19, reveals that the 
disputed passage from McFarland in no way implicates the constitutional waiver standard 
the Majority has interpolated into it. 
1. 
 The greatest difficulty with the Majority's analysis is that it confuses the 
equitable concept of "unclean hands," which disentitles a party to equitable relief, with 
"waiver."  As we recently observed in United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 
1995), the "most commonly understood method of 'waiving' a constitutional right is by an 
affirmative, verbal request."  Id. at 1099 (emphasis added).  If this is what the 
Majority's formulation requires, a stay of execution under § 2251 must issue as a matter 
of law unless a state can prove that an inmate affirmatively said the words "I know of my 
right to a government-supplied attorney under § 848(q)(4)(B) and am choosing to forgo it."  
But this belies reality because no inmate bent on waiting until the last minute to pursue 
post-conviction remedies will ever say those words within earshot of a state official
for good reason.  Thus, no state could ever prove "inexcusably ignores . . . and flouts" 
under the Majority's formulation. 
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 Elaborating on its waiver requirement, however, the Majority insists that an 
affirmative verbal waiver is unnecessary and that both words and conduct can be indicative 
of an inmate's "waiver" of "his or her right to counseled habeas review." Majority 
Typescript at 22 n.13.  But nowhere does the Majority provide any examples of words and 
conduct that would rise to the level of "waiver."  Nor does the Majority attempt to 
explain why the record in this case fails to satisfy its waiver standard.  If the facts 
found by the district court in this case are insufficient to establish waiver under the 
Majority's view, then it is difficult to imagine any set of circumstances, other than an 
affirmative verbal waiver which the Majority expressly disavows, see id., in which a stay 
of execution may be denied under McFarland. 
 McFarland's language contemplates that inequitable conduct can lead to a total 
forfeiture of equitable relief under §2251 to which the inmate is otherwise entitled as a 
matter of law. This is entirely consistent with notion that the equitable doctrine of 
"unclean hands" can bar relief in federal habeas, see Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654, 112 S. Ct. 
at 1653; Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17-18, 83 S. Ct. at 1078, even where it is the inmate's 
first petition. Lonchar, 58 F.3d at 590. 
2. 
 The Majority imports Johnson v. Zerbst's "waiver" requirement into McFarland
because it appears to believe that the right to appointed counsel in § 848(q)(4)(B) 
occupies the same venerated status as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Majority 
Typescript at 19-21 & nn.11-12.  Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so 
"fundamental" to fair adjudication,  Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1097, counsel must be pr
regardless of whether criminal defendants are aware of their rights.  Precisely for that 
reason the "waiver" standard enunciated in Johnson is a stringent one.  Based on this 
analogy, the Majority essentially holds that states must provide habeas counsel to 
indigent inmates unless and until the inmate affirmatively and verbally expresses a 
contrary desire. 
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 This both misstates and grossly exaggerates the role of § 848(q)(4)(B) in the 
scheme of federal habeas.  Unlike the Sixth Amendment, § 848(q)(4)(B) is neither an 
affirmative obligation nor a negative restriction on states.  On the contrary, it is 
simply "a funding statute [that] provides for the appointment of attorneys . . .  for 
defendants or habeas corpus petitioners seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence."  
Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F.3d  885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).  It is the inmate, 
therefore, who must take the initiative.  Even then, however, a stay of execution to give 
effect to the right to counsel, once invoked, will not be forthcoming if the inmate comes 
into federal court with unclean hands; that is, if he has "inexcusably ignore[d post
conviction remedies] and flout[ed] the available processes." McFarland, ___ U.S. at ___, 
114 S. Ct. at 2573. 
 The Majority's view essentially converts the counsel-funding statute into a flat 
prohibition on executing death-sentenced inmates until a first habeas petition has been 
prepared and filed.  But McFarland's "stay discretion" analysis contemplates that some 
dilatory capital inmates could be executed before a first petition has been considered on 
the merits.  The Majority's position, therefore, directly contravenes the Supreme Court's 
explicit admonition that its "conclusion by no means grants capital defendants a right to 
an automatic stay of execution." Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2573. 
3. 
 There is a third difficulty with the "waiver" standard. If the Majority is 
indeed correct that the McFarland Court contemplated denying a stay only when there has 
been a true verbal waiver, then the Court's separate treatment of "stay discretion" and 
"stay jurisdiction" was unnecessary; under the Majority's view the two merge. 
 As discussed earlier, the rationale for the Court's "stay jurisdiction" holding 
is that if a defendant who seeks federal habeas relief and attempts to invoke his right to 
a government-supplied lawyer under § 848(q)(4)(B) is executed before the petition has been 
prepared and filed, the statutory right would be meaningless.  But where an inmate
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dilatory or otherwise--has affirmatively waived his right to a lawyer under § 
848(q)(4)(B), McFarland indicates that a district court would lack subject
jurisdiction under § 2251 even to consider the request.  "[A] district court has 
jurisdiction to enter a stay of execution where necessary to give effect to that statutory 
right."  McFarland, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2574 (emphasis added).  Since a stay of 
execution logically cannot give effect to a statutory right that the inmate has 
affirmatively waived, the Majority's "waiver" standard effectively collapses McFarland
distinct "stay jurisdiction" and "stay discretion" discussions into a single inquiry.
 More significantly, collapsing McFarland's "stay jurisdiction" and "stay 
discretion" discussions into a single inquiry has the effect of placing the burden of 
proof on the "inexcusably ignores . . . flouts" issue on the inmate.  It is well-
that the party seeking federal relief must plead and prove facts sufficient to demonstrate 
a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., McNutt v. General Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S. Ct. 780, 785 (1936); Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995).  If discretion to issue a stay exists 
only where there is jurisdiction to grant a stay, then a prima facie showing of 
entitlement to a stay would require affirmative proof of nonwaiver. Because the Majority 
insists that the burden to demonstrate waiver is on the state, Majority Typescript at 20
21, its waiver analysis proves to be wholly unworkable.0 
B. 
                     
0I agree with the Majority that the burden to show "inexcusably ignores . . . and flouts" 
rests with the state, but I base that conclusion on the simple fact that McFarland
expresses a presumption in favor of a stay.  Since that presumption is rebutted only when 
the inmate has "inexcusably ignore[d] . . . and flout[ed],"  the state should bear the 
burden of demonstrating that an inmate has engaged in conduct that disentitles him to 
equity relief that otherwise would issue as a matter of law.  See generally  Ciba
Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 844, 855 (3d Cir. 1984) ("unclean hands" is an 
affirmative defense; burden of persuasion on party resisting opponent's request for 
equitable relief), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S. Ct. 2678 (1985). 
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 The second reason the Majority relies on to support its decision to reverse also 
flows directly from its constitutional waiver requirement.  The Majority appears to 
believe that when the Supreme Court referred to an inmate who "inexcusably ignores 
opportunity and flouts available processes," it was requiring that the inmate have a 
specific awareness of the federal right to counsel codified in § 848(q)(4)(B):  
[T]he opportunity and processes of which the Supreme Court 
spoke in the passage at issue . . . include the right to 
federal habeas counsel . . . . We believe that the Court's 
antecedent reference in that passage to a capital 
defendant's 'right to counsel' . . . compel[s] this result. 
 
Majority Typescript at 16.  Since there was no record evidence that Duffey specifically 
was aware of his statutory right to a government-supplied attorney, the argument 
continues, Duffey could not have knowingly and intelligently "waived," or "inexcusably 
ignore[d]," that right as a matter of law.  I disagree. 
 In my view, the McFarland Court's reference to "this opportunity" was addressed 
to state and federal post-conviction processes in a general sense, not to the counsel
funding statute specifically.  As noted above, the statutory right to counsel obtains only 
if and when an inmate decides to initiate federal habeas relief.  But inmates who 
purposely decline to invoke state or federal collateral remedies solely to delay execution 
are intentionally subjecting themselves to the very risk that a stay of execution under 
McFarland is designed to avoid: execution prior to having a federal court adjudicate their 
constitutional claims on the merits.  Thus, a specific awareness of § 848(q)(4)(B) is 
irrelevant to the McFarland inquiry; rather, the deliberate creation of exigent 
circumstances necessitating federal court intervention into state proceedings should be 
the central focus. 
 There is a more common-sense reason for interpreting the Supreme Court's 
reference to "this opportunity" as relating to collateral remedies generally.  Capital 
inmates who are cognizant of state and federal post-conviction processes but who are 
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determined to wait until a death warrant has been signed to invoke them will not be 
motivated to seek relief any sooner simply because they know that a government-supplied 
attorney stands ready and willing to prepare and file their habeas petitions.  The Sixth 
Circuit's recent observation about the current state of death-penalty litigation confirms 
that even 
counsel for a death-sentenced criminal never wishes to file 
a habeas corpus petition unless that is the last-ditch way 
to avoid an actual execution, when the prisoner is more 
concerned with avoiding execution than with receiving a 
final adjudication of his claims. . . . Therefore, it is 
almost always in the interest of a death-sentenced prisoner 
to delay filing that petition as long as possible. 
 
Steffen, 39 F.3d at 625 (emphasis added).  If counsel for a capital defendant acting in 
his client's best interests will deliberately wait until the eve of execution to file a 
first habeas petition, then an unrepresented inmate's specific awareness of a statutory 
counsel-funding provision is unlikely to alter the inmate's behavior.  The counsel 
statute, therefore, should not be dispositive of McFarland's dilatoriness inquiry. 
C. 
 Finally, I agree with the Majority that the district court erred in looking to 
the "cause" prong of the "cause and prejudice" test to determine whether Duffey's ignoring 
of available postconviction remedies was "inexcusable" under McFarland. 
Majority Typescript at 18.0  The "cause and prejudice" standard is not implicated by the 
McFarland Court's language and, thus, is irrelevant. 
 In any event, "cause," as the Majority observes, refers to a deliberate bypass 
of a state procedural requirement, whereas McFarland is concerned with the failure to 
invoke either state or federal substantive remedies.  Indeed, the "cause" analogy is 
                     
0As the Majority recognizes, the factors the district court analyzed under its "cause" 
analysis--possible state interference with Duffey's attempts to litigate and cognitive 
impairment--certainly were relevant to the question whether there was some force external 
to Duffey that prevented him from invoking postconviction remedies.  To this extent, 
therefore, the district court's legal error was harmless, because it ultimately led to a 
more developed factual record. 
37 
illogical, for while the failure to initiate a state postconviction proceeding until a 
death warrant has been signed may be "excusable" (because it is permissible) under state 
procedural law, it very well may simultaneously constitute "inexcusably ignor[ing] . . . 
and flout[ing]" under McFarland.  That is so because, as the Majority observes, t
exhaustion doctrine requires that a habeas petitioner first present his claims to the 
state courts before obtaining federal habeas relief.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Ex Parte 
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734 (1886); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.
731, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991).  Since exhaustion of state remedies is a necessary 
predicate to obtaining federal habeas relief, a capital inmate should not be permitted to 
circumvent McFarland's warning to dilatory inmates simply by deliberately ignoring 
post-conviction remedies as a way of delaying federal habeas relief and, ultimately, 
execution.  Cf. Steffen, 39 F.3d at 622 (no jurisdiction to issue  McFarland stay to 
represented inmate so that counsel can pursue novel claims in state court); cf. also
Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 1995) (no right to counsel under § 848(q)(4)(B) 
to pursue unexhausted claims in state court).  Thus, I agree with the Majority that the 
"cause and prejudice" test is wholly inapposite to McFarland's dilatoriness inquiry.
IV. 
 The Supreme Court in McFarland specifically stated that a stay of execution may 
be denied if a death-row inmate "inexcusably ignores [post-conviction remedies] and flouts 
the available processes."  McFarland, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2573.  The district 
court found that for over six years after his direct appeal had been exhausted, Steven 
Duffey declined to attack collaterally his conviction and sentence simply to postpone his 
execution.  Those findings are amply supported by the record.  The district court's 
decision to deny the stay, therefore, was well within its discretion under § 2251 and 
consistent with the dictates of McFarland.  Because I fear that the Majority's "waiver" 
standard will render the issuance of a stay under § 2251 automatic in this Circuit, 
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notwithstanding the McFarland Court's express admonition to the contrary, I respectfully 
dissent. 
